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Abstract
Modifications of Markovski quasigroup based crypto-algorithm have been proposed. Some of
these modifications are based on the systems of orthogonal n-ary groupoids. T -quasigroups
based stream ciphers have been constructed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
This paper is an extended variant and a prolongation of the paper [19]. Information on quasigroups
and n-ary quasigroups it is possible to find in [10, 13, 14, 52], on ciphers in [43, 35]. Some applications
of quasigroups in cryptology are described in [20, 21, 49, 30, 56].
Two main elementary methods of ciphering the information are known.
(i). Symbols in a plaintext (or in its piece (its bit)) are permuted by some law. One of the first
known ciphers of such kind is cipher ”Scital” (Sparta, 2500 years ago).
(ii). All symbols in a fixed alphabet are changed by a law on other letters of this alphabet. One
of the first ciphers of such kind was Cezar’s cipher (x → x + 3 for any letter of Latin alphabet, for
example a→ d, b→ e and so on).
In many contemporary ciphers (DES, old Russian GOST, Blowfish [44, 23]) the methods (i) and
(ii) are used with some modifications. Therefore, permutations and substitutions are main elementary
cryptographical procedures.
What does the use of quasigroups in cryptography give us? It gives the same permutations and
substitutions but easy generated, requiring not very big volume of a device memory, acting ”locally”
on only one block of a plain-text.
”Stream ciphers are an important class of encryption algorithms. They encrypt individual charac-
ters (usually binary digits) of a plaintext message one at a time, using an encryption transformation
which varies with time.
By contrast, block ciphers tend to simultaneously encrypt groups of characters of a plaintext
message using a fixed encryption transformation. Stream ciphers are generally faster than block
ciphers in hardware, and have less complex hardware circuitry.
They are also more appropriate, and in some cases mandatory (e.g., in some telecommunications
applications), when buffering is limited or when characters must be individually processed as they are
received. Because they have limited or no error propagation, stream ciphers may also be advantageous
in situations where transmission errors are highly probable” [43].
Stream-ciphers based on quasigroups and their parastrophes were discovered in the end of the
XX-th century [37, 38, 41].
Often by enciphering a block (a letter) Bi of a plaintext the previous ciphered block Ci−1 is used.
Notice that Horst Feistel was one of the first who proposed such method of encryption (Feistel net)
[28].
It is clear that by the construction of a stream cipher it is impossible to use method (i) (see
above). But it is possible to use method (ii) and Feistel schema. Of course these methods cannot be
unique.
1.2 Basic definitions
We give some definitions. A sequence xm, xm+1, . . . , xn, where m,n are natural numbers and m ≤ n,
will be denoted by xnm. If m > n, then x
n
m will be considered empty. The sequence x, . . . , x (k times)
will be denoted by xk. The expression 1, n designates the set {1, 2, . . . , n} of natural numbers [13].
A non-empty set Q together with an n-ary operation A : Qn → Q, n ≥ 2 is called n-groupoid
and it is denoted by (Q,A).
It is convenient to define n-ary quasigroup in the following manner.
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Definition 1. An n-ary groupoid (Q,A) with n-ary operation A such that in the equality A(x1,
x2, . . . , xn) = xn+1 the knowledge of any n elements from the elements x1, x2, . . . , xn, xn+1 uniquely
specifies the remaining one is called n-ary quasigroup [13].
From Definition 1 follows [10, 52, 53] that any quasigroup (Q,A) defines else ((n + 1)! − 1)
n-quasigroups, so-called parastrophes of quasigroup (Q,A).
In binary case any quasigroup (Q,A) defines else five quasigroups namely (Q, (13)A), (Q, (23)A),
(Q, (12)A), (Q, (123)A), (Q, (132)A). See [10, 52, 55] for details.
We give classical equational definition of binary quasigroup [26].
Definition 2. A binary groupoid (Q,A) is called a binary quasigroup if on the set Q there exist
operations (13)A and (23)A such that in the algebra (Q,A, (13)A, (23)A) the following identities are
fulfilled:
A((13)A(x, y), y) = x, (1)
(13)A(A(x, y), y) = x, (2)
A(x, (23)A(x, y)) = y, (3)
(23)A(x,A(x, y)) = y. (4)
By tradition the operation A is denoted by ·, (23)A by \ and (13)A by /.
It is possible to give equational definition of n-ary quasigroup as a generalization of Definition 2.
We follow [13, 50].
Definition 3. An n-ary groupoid (Q,A) is called an n-ary quasigroup if on the set Q there exist
operations (1, n+1)A, (2, n+1)A, . . . , (n, n+1)A such that in the algebra (Q,A, (1, n+1)A, . . . , (n, n+1)A) the
following identities are fulfilled for all i ∈ 1, n:
A(xi−11 ,
(i, n+1)A(xn1 ), x
n
i+1) = xi, (5)
(i, n+1)A(xi−11 , A(x
n
1 ), x
n
i+1) = xi. (6)
In [29] it is proved that any n-ary quasigroup of order k ≥ 7 is a special kind composition of
binary quasigroups isotopic to a fixed quasigroup.1
Definition 4. Let (G, ·) be a groupoid and let a be a fixed element in G. Translation maps La (left)
and Ra (right) are defined by the following equalities Lax = a · x, Rax = x · a for all x ∈ G. For
quasigroups it is possible to define a third kind of translation, namely, middle translations. If Pa is
a middle translation of a quasigroup (Q, ·), then x · Pax = a for all x ∈ Q [12].
It is well known that in a quasigroup (Q, ·) any left and right translation is a bijective map of the
set Q [10, 52].
1.3 Quasigroup based cryptosystem
We give based on binary quasigroup encoding algorithm. We use [53].
A quasigroup (Q, ·) and its (23)-parastrophe (Q, \) satisfy the following identities x · (x\y) = y,
x\(x · y) = y. These are identities (3) and (4), respectively.
The authors [37, 38] propose to use this quasigroup property to construct the following stream
cipher.
1The author thanks Prof. F.M. Sokhatsky that informed his about this result of M.M. Glukhov.
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Algorithm 1. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet, k be a natural number, ui, vi ∈ Q, i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Define a quasigroup (Q,A). It is clear that the quasigroup (Q, (23)A) is defined in a unique way.
Take a fixed element l (l ∈ Q), which is called a leader.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q.
It is proposed the following ciphering procedure
v1 = A(l, u1),
vi = A(vi−1, ui), i = 2, ..., k.
Therefore we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . vk.
The deciphering algorithm is constructed in the following way: u1 =
(23)A(l, v1), ui =
(23)A(vi−1, vi),
i = 2, ..., k.
Indeed (23)A(vi−1, vi) =
(23)A(vi−1, A(vi−1, ui))
(4)
= ui.
Notice, the equality A = (23)A is fulfilled if and only if A(x,A(x, y)) = y for all x, y ∈ Q.
1.4 Modifications and generalizations
The improvements and researches of Algorithm 1 were carried out intensively. Some information
on this process is given in [53]. We thank our colleagues A. Krapez, V. Bakeva, V. Dimitrova and
A. Popovska-Mitrovikj for the following new information.
Remark 1. In article [5], the authors find the distribution of k-tuples of letters after n applications
of quasigroup transformation (k > n) (i.e. Algorithm 1) and give an algorithm for statistical attack
in order to discover the original message. Also, they give some conclusions on how to protect the
original messages.
In work [34], Krapez defines parastrophic quasigroup transformation. In [6], the authors propose
a modification of this transformation and give a new classification of quasigroups of order 4. Finally,
in [17] the authors presented this transformation and gave relationship between the new classification
and the symmetries of quasigroups.
Notice, parastrophic transformations from [34, 22] are promising for further applications and
researches.
In Algorithm 1 it is possible to use also a quasigroup (Q,A) and its (13) -, (123)- , (132)-
parastrophe since quasigroup (Q,A) and these parastrophes fulfill the following identities, namely,
identities (2), (7), and (8), respectively [55, 34, 22].
(123)A(A(x, y), x) = y (7)
(132)A(y, A(x, y)) = x (8)
More details in this direction are in [34].
In [38], the authors claimed that this cipher is resistant to the brute force attack (exhaustive
search) and to the statistical attack (in many languages some letters meet more frequently, than
other letters)2. Later similar results were presented in [49].
In dissertation of Milan Vojvoda [62] has been proved that this cipher is not resistant to chosen
ciphertext attack and chosen plaintext attack. It is claimed that this cipher is not resistant to special
kind of statistical attack (Slovak language) [62].
2The author thanks his colleagues A. Krapez, V. Bakeva, V. Dimitrova and A. Popovska-Mitrovikj for this infor-
mation (private letter).
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There exist a few other ways to generalize Algorithm 1. The most obvious way is to increase arity
of a quasigroup, i.e. instead of binary to apply n-ary (n ≥ 3) quasigroups. This way was proposed
in [53, 54] and was realized in [51, 50]. See below Algorithm 4. Notice Prof. A. Petrescu writes that
he found this n-ary generalization independently.
In [19], the authors proved that cipher based on Algorithm 4 is not resistant to chosen ciphertext
attack and chosen plaintext attack.
Some modifications in order to make Algorithm 1 more resistant against known attacks can be
found in [34, 22]. One of these attempts, taking into consideration Vojvoda results [62], was proposed
in [56]. Namely instead of a binary quasigroup and its parastrophe it was proposed to use a system
of n n-ary orthogonal operations (groupoids).
Also it was proposed to use these two crypto-primitives together in one cryptographical procedure.
1.5 A modification of Algorithm 1
Sometimes only the use of other record of a mathematical fact leads to a generalization.
We re-write Algorithm 1 using concept of translation in the following way:
Algorithm 2. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet. Define a quasigroup (Q, ·). It is clear that the
quasigroup (Q,
(23)
· ) is defined in a unique way.
Take a fixed element l (l ∈ Q), which is called a leader.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q.
It is proposed the following ciphering procedure
v1 = l · u1 = Llu1,
v2 = v1 · u2 = Lv1u2.
vi = vi−1 · ui = Lvi−1ui, i = 3, ..., k.
Therefore we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . vk.
The deciphering algorithm is constructed in the following way. We have the following cipher-text:
v1v2 . . . vk. Recall L
(23)
·
a = (L
·
a)
−1 for any a ∈ Q [53]. Below we shall denote translation L
(23)
·
a as L
∗
a,
translation L·a as La for any a ∈ Q. Then
u1 = l
(23)
· v1 = L
∗
l (v1) = L
∗
l (Llu1) =
L−1l (Llu1) = u1;
ui = vi−1
(23)
· vi = L
∗
vi−1
(vi) = L
∗
vi−1
(
Lvi−1ui
)
=
L−1vi−1
(
Lvi−1ui
)
= ui
(9)
for all i ∈ 2, k.
From this form of Algorithm 1 we can obtain easily the following generalization. Instead of
translations Lx, x ∈ Q, we propose to use in the enciphering part of this algorithm powers of these
translations, i.e., to use permutations of the form Lkx, k ∈ Z, instead of permutations of the form Lx.
The proposed modification forces us to use permutations of the form Lkx, k ∈ Z, also in the
decryption procedure.
Algorithm 3. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet. Define a quasigroup (Q, ·). It is clear that the
quasigroup (Q,
(23)
· ) is defined in a unique way.
Take a fixed element l (l ∈ Q), which is called a leader.
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Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q.
It is proposed the following ciphering procedure
v1 = L
a
l u1, a ∈ Z,
v2 = L
b
v1
u2, b ∈ Z,
vi = L
c
vi−1
ui, i ∈ 3, k, c ∈ Z.
(10)
Therefore we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . vk. The deciphering algorithm is constructed in
the following way. We use notations of Algorithm 2. Recall (L∗x)
a = L−ax for all x ∈ Q. Then
(L∗l )
a (v1) = (L
∗
l )
a (Lal u1) = u1,
(L∗v1)
b (v2) = (L
∗
v1
)b
(
Lbv1u2
)
= u2,
(L∗vi−1)
c (vi) = (L
∗
vi−1
)c(Lcvi−1ui) = ui, i ∈ 3, k.
(11)
Notice, the elements a, b, c in equalities (10) should be vary from step to step in order to protect
this Algorithm against chosen plain-text and chosen cipher-text attack. It is clear that the right and
middle [53] translations are also possible to use in Algorithm 3 instead of the left translations. See
below.
1.6 n-ary analogs of binary algorithms
We give n-ary analog of Algorithm 1 [51, 19].
Algorithm 4. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet, k be a natural number, ui, vi ∈ Q, i ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Define an n-ary quasigroup (Q, f). It is clear that any quasigroup (Q, (i, n+1)f) for any fixed value i
is defined in a unique way. Below for simplicity we put i = n.
Take fixed elements l
(n−1)(n−1)
1 (li ∈ Q), which are called leaders.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q.
It is proposed the following ciphering (encryption) procedure
v1 = f(l
n−1
1 , u1),
v2 = f(l
2n−2
n , u2),
. . . ,
vn−1 = f(l
(n−1)(n−1)
n2−3n+3 , un−1),
vn = f(v
n−1
1 , un),
vn+1 = f(v
n
2 , un+1),
vn+2 = f(v
n+1
3 , un+2),
. . .
(12)
Therefore we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . , vn−1, vn, vn+1, . . . .
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The deciphering algorithm also is constructed similarly with binary case:
u1 =
(n, n+1)f(ln−11 , v1),
u2 =
(n, n+1)f(l2n−2n , v2),
. . . ,
un−1 =
(n, n+1)f(l
(n−1)(n−1)
n2−3n+3 , vn−1)
un =
(n, n+1)f(vn−11 , vn),
un+1 =
(n, n+1)f(vn2 , vn+1),
un+2 =
(n, n+1)f(vn+13 , vn+2),
. . .
(13)
Indeed, for example, (n, n+1)f(vn−11 , vn) =
(n, n+1)f(vn−11 , f(v
n−1
1 , un))
(6)
= un.
Remark 2. It is easy to see that in encryption procedure (equalities (12)) and, therefore, in de-
cryption procedure (equalities (13)) it is possible to use more than one fixed n-quasigroup operation
f .
Below we shall denote this encryption algorithm as G(u), because on any step it is enciphered
only one element of a plaintext. Probably it makes sense to use in Algorithm 4 irreducible 3-ary or
4-ary finite quasigroup [13, 18, 1, 2]. We give an example of 3-ary irreducible quasigroup (Q,A) of
order 4 [13, p. 115].
Example 1.
A0 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 2 3 0
2 2 3 0 1
3 3 0 1 2
A1 0 1 2 3
0 1 0 3 2
1 0 1 2 3
2 3 2 1 0
3 2 3 0 1
A2 0 1 2 3
0 2 3 0 1
1 3 0 1 2
2 0 1 2 3
3 1 2 3 0
A3 0 1 2 3
0 3 2 1 0
1 2 3 0 1
2 1 0 3 2
3 0 1 2 3
Notice A(0, 1, 2) = A0(1, 2) = 3, A(2, 3, 2) = A2(3, 2) = 3. Moreover A(0, 1, x) = A(2, 3, x) for any
x ∈ Q. Then translations T (0, 1,−) and T (2, 3,−) are equal, pairs of leaders (0, 1) and (2, 3) are
equal from cryptographical point of view.
Recall there exist two groups of order 4, namely cyclic group Z4 and Klein group Z2 × Z2. Any
binary quasigroup of order 4 is a group isotope [3, 4].
Lemma 1. Quasigroup from Example 1 is not an isotope of a 3-ary group (Q, f) with the form
f(x31) = x1 + x2 + x3 where (Q,+) is a binary group of order 4.
Proof. If a quasigroup is an isotope of a 3-ary group (Q, f) with the form f(x31) = x1+x2+x3 where
(Q,+) is a binary group, then this quasigroup is reducible [13, Corollary, p. 115].
A translation of n-ary quasigroup (Q, f) (n > 2) will be denoted as T (a1, . . . , ai−1,−, ai+1, . . . , an),
where ai ∈ Q for all i ∈ 1, n and
T (a1, . . . , ai−1,−, ai+1, . . . , an)x = f(a1, . . . , ai−1, x, ai+1, . . . , an)
for all x ∈ Q.
From definition of n-ary quasigroup follows that any translation of n-ary quasigroup (Q, f) is a
permutation of the set Q.
7
Lemma 2. If fT (a1, . . . , an−1,−) is a translation of a quasigroup (Q, f), then
fT
−1(a1, . . . , an−1,−) = (n,n+1)fT (a1, . . . , an−1,−)
Proof. In the proof we omit the symbol f in the notation of translations of quasigroup (Q, f). We
have
T−1(a1, . . . , an−1,−)(T (a1, . . . , an−1,−)x) =
T−1(a1, . . . , an−1,−)f(a1, . . . , an−1, x) =
(n,n+1)f(a1, . . . , an−1, f(a1, . . . , an−1, x))
(6)
= x
(14)
We propose an n-ary analogue of Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 5. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet. Define an n-ary quasigroup (Q, f). It is clear
that the quasigroup (Q, (n,n+1)f) is defined in a unique way.
Take fixed elements l
(n−1)(n−1)
1 (li ∈ Q), which are called leaders.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q.
It is proposed the following ciphering (encryption) procedure
v1 = T
a(l1, l2, . . . , ln−1, u1),
v2 = T
b(ln, ln+1, . . . , l2n−2, u2),
. . . ,
vn−1 = T
c(ln2−3n+3, . . . , l(n−1)(n−1), un−1),
vn = T
d(v1, . . . , vn−1, un),
vn+1 = T
e(v2, . . . , vn, un+1),
vn+2 = T
t(v3, . . . , vn+1, un+2),
. . .
(15)
Therefore we obtain the following cipher-text v1v2 . . . vk.
Taking into consideration Lemma 2 we can say that deciphering algorithm is possible, it is con-
structed similarly with the deciphering in Algorithm 3.
Remark 3. It is easy to see that in Algorithm 5 it is possible to use various quasigroup translations
and to take quasigroups of various arity.
2 Ciphers based on orthogonal n-ary groupoids
2.1 Some definitions
We give classical definition of orthogonality of n-ary operations [9, 15].
Definition 5. n-ary groupoids (Q, f1), (Q, f2), . . . , (Q, fn) are called orthogonal, if for any fixed
n-tuple a1, a2, . . . , an the following system of equations
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

f1(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = a1
f2(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = a2
. . .
fn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = an
(16)
has a unique solution.
If the set Q is finite, then any system of n orthogonal n-ary groupoids (Q, fi) i ∈ 1, n, defines
a permutation of the set Qn and vice versa [11, 15, 9]. Therefore if |Q| = q, then there exist (qn)!
systems of n-ary orthogonal groupoids defined on the set Q.
There exist various generalizations of definition of orthogonality of n-ary operations. Fresh gen-
eralizations are in [57, 58].
Definition 6. n-ary groupoids (Q, f1), (Q, f2), . . . , (Q, fk) (2 ≤ k ≤ n) given on a set Q of order
m are called orthogonal if the system of equations (16) has exactly mn−k solutions for any k-tuple
a1, a2, . . . , ak, where a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ Q (see [16]).
If k = n, then from Definition 6 we obtain standard Definition 5. Definition of orthogonality of
binary systems has rich and long history [20]. About n-ary case, for example, see [27].
2.2 Construction of orthogonal n-ary groupoids
In the following example sufficiently convenient and general way for the construction of systems of
orthogonal n-ary groupoids is given.
Example 2. Define operationsA1(x1, x2, x3), A2(x1, x2, x3), A3(x1, x2, x3) over the setM = {0, 1, 2 }
in the following way. Take all 27 triplets K = {(Ri, Si, Ti) | Ri, Si, Ti ∈ M, i ∈ 1, 27} in any fixed
order and put
A1(0, 0, 0) = R1, A1(0, 0, 1) = R2, A1(0, 0, 2) = R3, . . . , A1(2, 2, 2) = R27,
A2(0, 0, 0) = S1, A2(0, 0, 1) = S2, A2(0, 0, 2) = S3, . . . , A2(2, 2, 2) = S27,
A3(0, 0, 0) = T1, A3(0, 0, 1) = T2, A3(0, 0, 2) = T3, . . . , A3(2, 2, 2) = T27.
The operations A1, A2 and A3 form a system of orthogonal operations. If we take this 27 triplets in
other order, then we obtain other system of orthogonal 3-ary groupoids.
This way gives a possibility to construct easily inverse system B of orthogonal n-ary operations to
a fixed system A of orthogonal n-ary operations. Recall inverse system means that B(A(xn1 )) = x
n
1 ,
xi ∈ Q.
Example 3. [19]. We give example of three orthogonal ternary groupoids that are defined on four-
element set {0, 1, 2, 3}. Multiplication table of the first groupoid (in fact, of a quasigroup) is given
in Example 1. Below we give multiplication tables of other two 3-ary groupoids.
B0 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 1 3
1 0 2 3 0
2 1 2 1 3
3 1 1 2 2
B1 0 1 2 3
0 2 1 1 0
1 2 3 3 0
2 0 2 1 3
3 0 0 3 1
B2 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 0 0
1 2 0 3 1
2 0 2 3 2
3 3 2 1 1
B3 0 1 2 3
0 3 3 2 2
1 0 1 2 1
2 0 2 0 3
3 3 1 0 3
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C0 0 1 2 3
0 3 1 2 0
1 2 1 1 2
2 0 1 0 1
3 3 1 2 3
C1 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 1 3
1 1 2 3 1
2 0 2 2 0
3 1 3 1 1
C2 0 1 2 3
0 3 3 0 0
1 2 1 0 1
2 3 3 2 0
3 3 0 2 3
C3 0 1 2 3
0 2 1 0 0
1 2 0 2 3
2 3 3 2 0
3 2 0 0 3
From formula (qn)! follows that there exist (43)! = 64! orthogonal systems of 3-ary groupoids over
a set of order 4.
2.3 Ciphers on base of orthogonal systems of n-ary operation
Here we propose to use a system of orthogonal n-ary groupoids as additional procedure in order to
construct almost-stream cipher [56].
Orthogonal systems of n-ary quasigroups were studied in [59, 60, 25]. Such systems have more
uniform distribution of elements of base set and therefore such systems may be more preferable in
protection against statistical cryptanalytic attacks.
Algorithm 6. [19]. Let A be a non-empty finite alphabet, k be a natural number, xt1 be a plain-
text. Take a system of n n-ary orthogonal operations (A, fi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This system defines a
permutation F of the set An. We propose the following enciphering procedure.
• Step 1: yn1 = F
l(xn1 ), where l ≥ 1, l is a natural number, l is vary from one enciphering round
to other. If t < n, then we can add to plaintext some ”neutral” symbols.
• On the Steps ≥ 2 it is possible to use Feistel schema [28, 43]. For example, we can do
the following enciphering procedure zn1 = F
s(y2, y3, . . . , yn, xn+1), if arity n ≥ 2, or z
n
1 =
F s(y3, y4, . . . , yn, xn+1, xn+2), if n ≥ 3. And so on.
The deciphering algorithm is based on the fact that orthogonal system of n n-ary operations (16) has
a unique solution for any tuple of elements a1, . . . , an.
Algorithm 6 is sufficiently safe relative to chosen ciphertext and plaintext attack since the key is
a non-periodic sequence of applications of permutation F , i.e. sequence of powers of permutation F .
Therefore any permutation of the group 〈F 〉 can be used by ciphering information using Algorithm
6.
Recall application of only one step Algorithm 6 is not very safe since this procedure is not resistant
relatively chosen ciphertext attack and chosen plaintext attack.
3 Combined algorithms
3.1 Modifications of Algorithm 6
By our opinion some modifications of this algorithm are desirable. Following ”vector ideas” [45] we
propose as the first step to write any letter ui of a plaintext as n-tuple (n-vector) and after that to
apply Algorithm 6. For example it is possible to use a binary representation of characters of the
alphabet A.
It is possible to divide plain text u1, . . . , un on parts and to use Algorithm 6 to some parts, to a
text a part of which has been ciphered by Algorithm 6 on a previous ciphering round.
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It is possible to change in Algorithm 6 variables x1, . . . , xk (1 ≤ k ≤ (n − 1)) by some fixed
elements of the set Q and name these elements as leaders. Notice, if k = n − 1, then we obtain n
chipering images from any plaintext letter u.
If in a system of orthogonal n-ary operations there is at least one n-ary quasigroup, then we can
apply by ciphering of information Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 6 together with some non-periodical
frequency, i.e., for example, we can apply four times Algorithm 4 and after this we can apply five
times Algorithm 6 and so on.
It is possible to use as a period sequence decimal representation of an irrational or transcendent
number. In this case we can take as a key the sequence of application of Algorithm 4 and Algorithm
6.
Proposed modifications make realization of chosen plaintext attack and chosen ciphertext attack
more complicate.
Taking into consideration that in binary case one application of Algorithm 6 generates from
one plaintext symbol u two cipher symbols, say v1, v2, we may propose to apply Algorithm 6 for
two plaintext symbols (or to one cipher symbol and one plain symbol, else to two cipher symbols)
simultaneously.
We propose to use Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 6 simultaneously.
Algorithm 7. Suppose that we have a plaintext xt1, t ≥ n.
1. Divide plaintext on n-tuples.
2. We apply to any n-tuple of plaintext n-ary permutation F l(xn1 ) = y
n
1 .
3. To n-tuple yn1 we apply Algorithm 4 (its binary or k-ary variant) G(y
n
1 ) = z
n
1 . Probably it will
be better, if k < n.
4. We apply to n-tuple zn1 n-ary permutation F
s(zn1 ) = t
n
1 .
Deciphering algorithm is clear.
Below we denote the action of the left (right, middle) translation in the power a of a binary
quasigroup (Q, g1) on the element u1 by the symbol g1T
a
l1
(u1). And so on.
Algorithm 8. Enciphering. Initially we have plaintext u1, u2, . . . , u6.
Step 1.
g1T
a
l1
(u1) = v1
g2T
b
l2
(u2) = v2
F c1 (v1, v2) = (v
′
1, v
′
2)
Step 2.
g3T
d
v′1
(u3) = v3
g4T
e
v′2
(u4) = v4
F f2 (v3, v4) = (v
′
3, v
′
4)
Step 3.
g5T
g
v′3
(u5) = v5
g6T
h
v′4
(u6) = v6
F i3(v5, v6) = (v
′
5, v
′
6)
(17)
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And so on. We obtain ciphertext v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
6.
Deciphering. Initially we have ciphertext v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
6.
Step 1.
F−c1 (v
′
1, v
′
2) = (v1, v2)
g1T
−a
l1
(v1) = u1
g2T
−b
l2
(v2) = u2
Step 2.
F−f2 (v
′
3, v
′
4) = (v3, v4)
g3T
−d
v′1
(v3) = u3
g4T
−e
v′2
(v4) = u4
Step 3.
F−i3 (v
′
5, v
′
6) = (v5, v6)
g5T
−g
v′3
(v5) = u5
g6T
−h
v′4
(v6) = u6
(18)
We obtain plaintext u1, u2, . . . , u6.
It is clear that Algorithm 3 is a partial case of Algorithm 8.
As in Algorithm 3, in Algorithm 8 the elements a, b, c, . . . , h should be vary in order to protect
this algorithm against chosen plain-text and chosen cipher-text attack.
Algorithm 8 allows to obtain almost ”natural” stream cipher, i.e. stream cipher that encode a
pair of elements of a plaintext on any step. It is easy to see that Algorithm 8 can be generalized on
n-ary (n ≥ 3) case. One of the possible generalizations is realized in Algorithm 10.
Additional researches are necessary for the proposed in this subsection modifications.
3.2 Stream cipher on base of orthogonal system of binary parastrophic
quasigroups
This subsection is more of algebraic than cryptographical character. For the construction of Algo-
rithms 4 and 6 we propose the use of orthogonal systems of binary parastrophic quasigroups.
We start from the following theorem [47]. Here expression A⊥(23)Ameans that quasigroups (Q,A)
and (Q, (23)A) are orthogonal.
Theorem 1. For a finite quasigroup (Q,A) the following equivalences are fulfilled:
(i) A⊥(12)A⇐⇒ ((x\z) · x = (y\z) · y =⇒ x = y);
(ii) A⊥(13)A⇐⇒ (zx · x = zy · y =⇒ x = y);
(iii) A⊥(23)A⇐⇒ (x · xz = y · yz =⇒ x = y);
(iv) A⊥(123)A⇐⇒ (x · zx = y · zy =⇒ x = y);
(v) A⊥(132)A⇐⇒ (xz · x = yz · y =⇒ x = y)
for all x, y, z ∈ Q.
In order to construct quasigroups mentioned in Theorem 1 probably computer search is preferable.
It is possible to use GAP and Prover [42].
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Definition 7. A T -quasigroup (Q,A) is a quasigroup of the form A(x, y) = ϕx + ψy + c, where
(Q,+) is an abelian group, ϕ, ψ are some fixed automorphisms of this group, c is a fixed element of
the set Q [48, 33].
If (Q, ·) is a T -quasigroup of the form x ·y = ϕx+ψy+c, then its parastrophes have the following
forms, respectively:
x
(12)
· y = ψx+ ϕy + c,
x
(13)
· y = ϕ−1x− ϕ−1ψy − ϕ−1c,
x
(23)
· y = −ψ−1ϕx+ ψ−1y − ψ−1c,
x
(123)
· y = −ϕ−1ψx+ ϕ−1y − ϕ−1c,
x
(132)
· y = ψ−1x− ψ−1ϕy − ψ−1c.
(19)
See, for example, [47].
In order to construct a quasigroup (Q,A) that is orthogonal with its parastrophe in more theo-
retical way it is possible to use the following theorem [47].
Theorem 2. For a T -quasigroup (Q,A) of the form A(x, y) = ϕx + ψy + c over an abelian group
(Q,+) the following equivalences are fulfilled:
(i) A⊥12A⇐⇒ (ϕ− ψ), (ϕ+ ψ) are permutations of the set Q;
(ii) A⊥13A⇐⇒ (ε+ ϕ) is a permutation of the set Q;
(iii) A⊥23A⇐⇒ (ε+ ψ) is a permutation of the set Q;
(iv) A⊥123A⇐⇒ (ϕ+ ψ2) is a permutation of the set Q;
(v) A⊥132A⇐⇒ (ϕ2 + ψ) is a permutation of the set Q.
Corollary 1. T -quasigroup (Zp, ◦) of the form x ◦ y = k · x+m · y + c, where (Zp,+) is the cyclic
group of a prime order p, k,m, c ∈ Zp; k,m, k+m, k−m, k+1, m+1, k
2+m, k+m2 6= 0 (mod p),
where the operation · is multiplication modulo p, is orthogonal to any of its parastrophes.
Quasigroups from Corollary 1 are suitable objects to construct above mentioned Algorithms
(binary case).
The following table contains connections between different kinds of translations in different paras-
trophes of a binary quasigroup (Q, ·) [53, 55].
Table 1.
ε (12) (13) (23) (123) (132)
R R L R−1 P P−1 L−1
L L R P−1 L−1 R−1 P
P P P−1 L−1 R L R−1
R−1 R−1 L−1 R P−1 P L
L−1 L−1 R−1 P L R P−1
P−1 P−1 P L R−1 L−1 R
From Table 1 it follows, for example, that R(13) = R−1.
13
3.3 T-quasigroup based stream code
We give a numerical example of encryption Algorithm 8 based on T -quasigroups. Notice the number
257 is prime.
Example 4. Take the cyclic group (Z257,+) = (A,+).
1. Define T-quasigroup (A, ∗) with the form x ∗ y = 2 · x + 131 · y + 3 with a leader element l1,
say, l1 = 17. Denote the mapping x 7→ x ∗ l1 by the letter Rl1 , i.e. Rl1(x) = x ∗ l1 for all x ∈ A.
In order to find the mapping R−1l1 taking into consideration Table 1 we find the form of operation
(13)
∗ using formula (19). We have x
(13)
∗ y = 129 · x+ 63 · y + 127, R−1l1 x = x
(13)
∗ l1 = R
(13)
l1
x.
In some sense quasigroup (A,
(13)
∗ ) is the ”right inverse quasigroup” to quasigroup (A, ∗). From
identity (8) follows that quasigroup (A,
(132)
∗ ) is the ”left inverse” quasigroup to quasigroup
(A, ∗). Notice from Corollary 1 follows that (A, ∗)⊥(A,
(13)
∗ ).
2. Define T-quasigroup (A, ◦) with the form x ◦ y = 10 · x+ 81 · y + 53 with a leader element l2,
say, l2 = 71. Denote the mapping x 7→ l2 ∗ x by the letter Ll2 , i.e. Ll2(x) = l2 ◦ x for all x ∈ A.
In order to find the mapping L−1l2 we use Table 1 and find the form of operation
(23)
◦ by formula
(19). We have x
(23)
◦ y = 149 · x+ 165 · y + 250.
3. Define a system of two parastroph orthogonal T-quasigroups (A, ·) and (A,
(23)
· ) in the following
way {
x · y = 3 · x+ 5 · y + 6
x
(23)
· y = 205 · x+ 103 · y + 153
Denote quasigroup system (A, ·,
(23)
· ) by F (x, y), since this system is a function of two variables.
In order to find the mapping F−1(x, y) we solve the system of linear equations{
3 · x+ 5 · y + 6 = a
205 · x+ 103 · y + 153 = b
We have ∆ = 55, 1/∆ = 243, x = 100 · a+ 70 · b+ 255, y = 43 · a+ 215 · b. Therefore we have,
if F (x, y) = (a, b), then F−1(a, b) = (100 · a + 70 · b+ 255, 43 · a + 215 · b), i.e.{
x = 100 · a+ 70 · b+ 255
y = 43 · a + 215 · b
We have defined the mappings g1 = Rl1 , g2 = Ll2 , F and now we can use them in Algorithm 8.
Let 212; 17; 65; 117 be a plaintext. We take the following values in formula (17): a = b = d =
e = f = 1; c = 2. Below we use Gothic font to distinguish leader elements, i.e. 17, 71 are leader
elements. Then
Step 1.
g1(212) = 212 ∗ 17 = 2 · 212 + 131 · 17 + 3 = 84
g2(17) = 71 ◦ 17 = 10 · 71 + 81 · 17 + 53 = 84
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F (84; 84) = (3 · 84 + 5 · 84 + 6; 205 · 84 + 103 · 84 + 153) = (164; 68)
F (164; 68) = (3 · 164 + 5 · 68 + 6; 205 · 164 + 103 · 68 + 153) = (67; 171)
Step 2.
g1(65) = 65 ∗ 67 = 2 · 65 + 131 · 67 + 3 = 172
g2(117) = 171 ◦ 117 = 10 · 171 + 81 · 117 + 53 = 189
F (172; 189) = (3 · 172 + 5 · 189 + 6; 205 · 172 + 103 · 189 + 153) = (182; 139)
We obtain the following ciphertext 67; 171; 182; 139.
For deciphering we use formula (18).
Step 1.
F−1(67; 171) = (100 · 67 + 70 · 171 + 255, 43 · 67 + 215 · 171) = (164; 68)
F−1(164; 68) = (100 · 164 + 70 · 68 + 255, 43 · 164 + 215 · 68) = (84; 84)
g−11 (84) = 84
(13)
∗ 17 = 129 · 84 + 63 · 17 + 127 = 212
g−12 (84) = 71
(23)
◦ 84 = 149 · 71 + 165 · 84 + 250 = 17
Step 2.
F−1(182; 139) = (100 · 182 + 70 · 139 + 255, 43 · 182 + 215 · 139) = (172; 189)
g−11 (172) = 172
(13)
∗ 67 = 129 · 172 + 63 · 67 + 127 = 65
g−12 (189) = 171
(23)
◦ 189 = 149 · 171 + 165 · 189 + 250 = 117
A little program using freeware version of programming language Pascal was developed. First
little experiments demonstrate that encoding-decoding is executed sufficiently fast.3
Remark 4. Proper binary groupoids are more preferable than linear quasigroups by construction of
the mapping F (x, y) in order to make encryption more safe, but in this case decryption may be slower
than in linear quasigroup case and definition of these groupoids needs more computer (or some other
device) memory. The same remark is true for the choice of the function g. Maybe a golden mean in
this choice problem is to use linear quasigroups over non-abelian, especially simple, groups.
Remark 5. In this cipher there exists a possibility of protection against standard statistical attack.
For this scope it is possible to denote more often used letters or pair of letters by more than one
integer or by more than one pair of integers.
3.4 Some generalization of functions of Algorithm 8
We give a method for the construction of functions that it is possible to use in cryptographical
procedures. Suppose that all functions are defined on a set Q. Functions F (xn1 ) and g(x
n
1 ) are
functions of n variables.
Function F (n orthogonal groupoids, a permutation of the set Qn) has inverse function of n
variables F−1(xn1 ) such that F (F
−1(xn1 )) = F
−1(F (xn1 )) = x
n
1 .
We recall, if g is n-ary quasigroup operation, then, in general, we cannot decode values x, y,
for example, from equality g(an−2, x, y) = b, but we can easy solve equation g(an−1, x) = b of one
variable, i. e. we can decode value of variable x.
Taking into consideration this quasigroup feature, we describe the set (clone) of functions that
it is possible to use in cryptology on base of these two kinds of functions, namely, functions F and
3The author thanks D.I. Pushkashu and A.V. Shcherbacov for their help by the writing of this program.
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g. We shall use concept of term [63] to define cryptographical terms (cryptographical functions)
inductively.
Cryptographical function (cryptographical term) below in Case 3 means that encoding and de-
coding of a text using this function (this term) is performed uniquely.
Algorithm 9. 1. Any individual constant is a cryptographical term.
2. Any individual variable is a cryptographical term.
3. (a) If g is an n-ary quasigroup functional constant ((Q, g) is an n-ary quasigroup) and t is
a term, bn1 are individual constant, then g
a(bi−11 , t, b
n
i+1), i ∈ 1, n, where a ∈ Z, is a
cryptographical term.
(b) If F is a permutation of a set Qn which is constructed using n orthogonal n-ary groupoids
and t1, t2, . . . , tn are quasigroup cryptographical terms, then F
a(t1, . . . , tn), where a ∈ Z,
is a cryptographical term.
Example 5. Let Q = B×B be a non-empty set, F be a pair of orthogonal groupoids every of which
is defined on the set B, and (Q, g) be a ternary quasigroup. Then g(q1, q2, F ), where q1, q2 are fixed
elements of Q, is a cryptographical term constructed following Rule 3, (a) of Algorithm 9.
In Example 4 cryptographical term F a(g1, g2) is constructed following Rule 3, (b) of Algorithm
9. Indeed, the function F is a pair of parastrophic orthogonal T -quasigroups that are defined on the
set Z257, i.e. F is a permutation of the set Z257×Z257; (Z257, g1), (Z257, g2) are binary T -quasigroups,
and a = 1; 2.
Algorithm 10. Suppose that we have n-ary permutation F , n procedures Gj (they may be of various
arity and it is supposed that leader elements are used) and plaintext xt1.
By the letter y with an index we denote an element of enciphered text or a leader element. We
propose the following enciphering procedure.
The i-th step of this procedure can have the following form
iF
k(G1(y
m
1 , xi), . . . , Gn(y
r
1, xi)) = iy
n
1 (20)
Deciphering algorithm is executed ”from the top to the bottom” in general and ”from the bottom to
the top” on any step. See more details in Algorithm 8.
3.5 On quasigroup based cryptcode
Using possibilities that give us Algorithms 9 and 10 we give an example of a quasigroup based hybrid4
of a code and a cypher. Following Markovski, Gligoroski, and Kocarev [40, 39], we name such hybrid
as a cryptcode.
We shall use Klein group Z2 ⊕ Z2, its automorphism group and the system of three ternary
orthogonal groupoids (Example 3).
Denote elements of the group Z2⊕Z2 as follows: {(0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1)}. The group Aut(Z2⊕
Z2) consists of the following automorphisms :(
1 0
0 1
)
,
(
1 0
1 1
)
,
(
1 1
0 1
)
,
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
(
1 1
1 0
)
,
(
0 1
1 1
)
4Hybrid idea is sufficiently known. For example, see [54, page 2], [53, page 65].
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Denote these automorphisms by the letters ε, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6, respectively.
Notice ϕ22 = ϕ
2
3 = ϕ
2
4 = ε, ϕ
2
5 = ϕ6, ϕ
2
6 = ϕ5. It is known that Aut(Z2 ⊕ Z2)
∼= S3 [31, 32].
For convenience we give Cayley table of the group Aut(Z2 ⊕ Z2).
· ε ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6
ε ε ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6
ϕ2 ϕ2 ε ϕ5 ϕ6 ϕ3 ϕ4
ϕ3 ϕ3 ϕ6 ε ϕ5 ϕ4 ϕ2
ϕ4 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6 ε ϕ2 ϕ3
ϕ5 ϕ5 ϕ4 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ6 ε
ϕ6 ϕ6 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ2 ε ϕ5
Information on codes is in [17]. We shall use a code that is given in [46, Example 19]. Suppose
that the symbols x, y are informational symbols and the symbol z is a check symbol. Remember,
x, y, z ∈ (Z2⊕Z2). We propose the following check equation x+ ϕ5y + ϕ6z = (0; 0), i.e., we propose
the following formula to find the element z:
z = ϕ5x+ ϕ6y (21)
Recall, statistical investigations of J. Verhoeff [61] and D.F. Beckley [8] have shown that the most
frequent errors made by human operators during transmission of data are single errors (i.e. errors
in exactly one component), adjacent transpositions (in other words errors made by interchanging
adjacent digits, i.e. errors of the form ab → ba), and insertion or deletion errors. We note, if all
codewords are of equal length, insertion and deletion errors can be detected easily.
Proposed code detects any single, transposition, and twin (aa→ bb) errors [46].
Further we construct three T -quasigroups over the group Z2 ⊕ Z2:
(Z2 ⊕ Z2, D) with the form D(x, y) = ϕ3x+ ϕ6y + a1;
(Z2 ⊕ Z2, E) with the form E(x, y) = ϕ2x+ ϕ5y + a2;
(Z2 ⊕ Z2, F ) with the form F (x, y) = ϕ3x+ ϕ5y + a3.
We use the following
Theorem 3. A T -quasigroup (Q, ·) of the form x · y = αx+ βy+ c and a T -quasigroup (Q, ◦) of the
form x◦ y = γx+ δy+ d, both over a group (Q,+) are orthogonal if and only if the map α−1β−γ−1δ
is an automorphism of the group (Q,+) [47].
Lemma 3. The quasigroups (Z2 ⊕ Z2, D), (Z2 ⊕ Z2, E), and (Z2 ⊕ Z2, F ) are orthogonal in pairs.
Proof. We can use Theorem 3 and Cayley table of the group Aut(Z2 ⊕ Z2).
Define three ternary operations in the following way: K1(D(x, y), z) = D(x, y)+z,K2(E(x, y), z) =
E(x, y) + z, K3(F (x, y), z) = F (x, y) + z.
Lemma 4. The triple of ternary operations K1(x, y, z), K2(x, y, z), K3(x, y, z) forms orthogonal sys-
tem of operation.
Proof. We solve the following system of equations

ϕ3x+ ϕ6y + a1 + z = b1
ϕ2x+ ϕ5y + a2 + z = b2
ϕ3x+ ϕ5y + a3 + z = b3
(22)
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where b1, b2, b3 are fixed elements of the set Z2 ⊕ Z2.
We use properties of the groups (Z2 ⊕ Z2) and Aut(Z2 ⊕ Z2).

ϕ3x+ ϕ6y + z = b1 + a1
ϕ2x+ ϕ5y + z = b2 + a2
ϕ3x+ ϕ5y + z = b3 + a3
(23)
We are doing the following transformations of the system (23): (first row + third row) → first
row; (second row + third row) → second row; and obtain the following system:

y = b1 + a1 + b3 + a3
x = ϕ4(b2 + a2 + b3 + b4)
ϕ3x+ ϕ5y + z = b3 + a3
(24)
If in the system (24) in the third equation we replace x by ϕ4(b2 + a2 + b3 + b4) and y by
b1 + a1 + b3 + a3, then we obtain

x = ϕ4(b2 + a2 + b3 + a3)
y = b1 + a1 + b3 + a3
z = b3 + a3 + ϕ5(b1 + a1 + b2 + a2)
(25)
Therefore the system (22) has a unique solution for any fixed elements b1, b2, b3 ∈ (Z2 ⊕ Z2),
operations K1(x, y, z), K2(x, y, z), K3(x, y, z) are orthogonal.
Triple of orthogonal operations K1(x, y, z), K2(x, y, z), K3(x, y, z) defines on the set Q
3 a permu-
tation. Denote this permutation by the letter K.
We shall use the system of three ternary orthogonal groupoids (Q,A), (Q,B), (Q,C) of order
4 from Example 3. See also [19]. Denote permutation that defines this system of three ternary
orthogonal groupoids by the letter M .
In order to use the system of orthogonal groupoids and the system of orthogonal T -quasigroups
simultaneously we redefine the basic set of the T -quasigroups in the following (non-unique) way
(0; 0)→ 0, (1; 0)→ 1, (0; 1)→ 2, (1; 1)→ 3.
We propose the following cryptographical term (a cryptographical primitive):
H(x, y, z) =Mk(K l(x, y, z)), k, l ∈ Z
Transformation H is a permutation of the set Q 3. Indeed, this transformation is a composition
of two permutations: K l and Mk.
Therefore we propose the following
Algorithm 11. 1. Take a pair of information symbols a, b ∈ (Z2 ⊕ Z2);
2. by formula (21) find value of the check symbol c;
3. apply cryptographical term H to the triple (a, b, c);
4. take a pair of information symbols d, e ∈ (Z2 ⊕ Z2);
5. by formula (21) find value of the check symbol f ;
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6. change values of the numbers k, l in the cryptographical term H; also it is possible to change
the term H by some other term of such or other type;
7. apply cryptographical term H to the triple (d, e, f);
8. and so on.
Procedure of decoding in Algorithm 11 is clear.
Recall, the number N(n) of mutually (in pairs) orthogonal Latin squares of order n fulfills the
following inequality N(n) ≤ (n − 1) [35]. Then for n = 4 we have N(4) ≤ 3. Therefore, for real
applications an analog of Algorithm 11 should be constructed over a set of order more than 4 and,
probably, with more powerful code [7].
3.6 A comparison of the ”power” of proposed algorithms
We shall compare how many permutations and of what length can be generated and can be used by
the working of some above mentioned algorithms.
Algorithm 1. If we shall use only one quasigroup (Q, ·), |Q| = n, then we can obtain by encoding
not more than n permutations of the group Sn.
Algorithm 3. If we shall use only one quasigroup (Q, ·), |Q| = n, then we shall use by encoding
the set S = ∪ni=1 〈Lai〉 of permutations which is a subset of the left multiplication group LM of
quasigroup (Q, ·). We recall LM(Q, ·) = 〈Lx | x ∈ Q〉 [10, 52, 53].
It is possible to construct a quasigroup (Q, ·) such that LM(Q, ·) = SQ. Notice, it is proved [24]
that there exist quasigroups with the property LM(Q, ·) = AQ, where AO is the alternating group
defined on the set Q [32, 31].
Therefore by encoding using Algorithm 3 we can obtain not more than |Sn| = n! permutations.
Situation with Algorithm 4 is similar to the situation with Algorithm 1. Since by encoding trans-
lations of an m-ary quasigroup (Q, f) are used, we can obtain not more than |Sn| = n! permutations.
The properties of multiplication group (more exactly, multiplication groups) of n-ary quasigroups
are not researched well.
Information on the multiplication groups of linear n-ary quasigroups is in [36]. These quasigroups
are used in [51, 50] by construction of some ciphers (see above).
Algorithm 5 is a synthesis of Algorithms 3 and 1. Here by the symbol Ti we denote translations
of an n-ary quasigroup (Q, f). It is clear that the order of the set S = ∪ 〈Ti〉 can be large but cannot
be more than |Sn| = n!.
In Algorithm 6 elements of the cyclic group 〈F 〉 ⊂ Snm , where |Q| = n,m is the arity of orthogonal
groupoids, can appear. In the above-mentioned inclusion cannot be equality even theoretically, since
the minimal number of generators of the symmetric group is equal to two [32, 31].
It is well known that a cycle of order n and a cycle of order two generate the symmetric group
Sn [32, 31].
The group Snm is an upper bound of the sets of permutations that can be generated during the
work of Algorithms 7, 10. For Algorithm 8 the group Sn2 is such upper bound. It is clear that in
Algorithm 8 by the encryption any permutation of the group Sn2 may be realized. But it also is clear
that this is not necessary from the cryptographical point of view.
The possible number of permutation generated during the work of the algorithm from Example
4 is bounded by the number (2572)! = 66049! and during the work of Algorithm 11 is bounded by
the number (64)!.
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